

# Strategy Research Project

## Assessing Post Conflict State Building Efforts

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Assessing Post Conflict State Building Efforts**

by

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## **Abstract**

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The United States has a history of invading countries and trying to rebuild the state in post conflict environment with limited success. Reviewing the outcome from recent endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq has highlighted the lack of significant success building capacity in many areas considered by organizations around the world as priorities and goals for weak states. Part of the reason for limited success was unfocused strategy. This paper reviews the need for assess state building missions by examining state building, evaluation frameworks and tools, and finally, presents Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali as case studies. With recent events in Mali, now is the time to consider what will be required to prevent Mali from becoming another failed state building mission.





## **Assessing Post Conflict State Building Efforts**

Our whole recent experience, then, our present duties and future prospects all point to the idea that by the study of war alone we shall be but little prepared for by far the greater burdens which are to fall upon us, which are the making of peace.<sup>1</sup>

—LTG Robert Lee Bullard, 1907  
First Commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army

The U.S. entered the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan with a specific military goal to topple the leader; however, once the goal was achieved, the U.S. discovered they had no strategy to deal with a failed state. The governments in Afghanistan and Iraq were unable to provide basic security services, or decision-making capacity for large parts of the country. The U.S. and its allies had no strategy or tool set for state building in these countries. Without these items, the U.S. was unable to evaluate effectiveness of any of its efforts or even determine when efforts were sufficient to allow the state to function efficiently on its own.

State building can be measured in terms of inputs (including manpower, money, and time) and outputs (such as casualties, peace, economic growth, and democratization). Success does not just depend on inputs but also in how the resources are employed and the susceptibility of the society in question to the changes implemented. Nevertheless, success, in some measure, depends on the quantity of international military and police personnel, the quantity of external financial assistance, and the time over which they are applied.<sup>2</sup> Whatever the tool used, a strategy must be formulated prior to state building efforts, and efforts must be evaluated during the process to ensure resources (time, money, personnel, etc), are focused on the correct area.

This paper will review the various definitions of stabilization efforts and the U.S. history of state building efforts, discuss tools and the evaluation methodology for state building, and review two cases in Afghanistan and Iraq in which the U.S. recently has employed state building efforts. It will conclude with a brief look at the current situation in Mali and propose some recommendations on how to address it and other similar situations that may occur in the future, with respect to evaluating potential state building efforts

### State Building Defined

There is a confusing array of efforts aimed at improving peace and security of other nations, from traditional U.N. peacekeeping efforts to state building. Adding to the confusion, there is no single definition of these efforts, as their scope and objectives vary greatly and often overlap. Although this paper focuses on state building, many of the concepts will be similar for the goals. Therefore, a basic definition of each type of is provided:

The U.N. defines peacekeeping as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”<sup>3</sup> Peacekeeping was born out of the Cold War, as a means to maintain cease fires and stabilize ground situations.<sup>4</sup> The first mission was in 1948 to the Middle East, to observe the armistice between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Since then, the U.N. has deployed 67 missions involving 120 countries.<sup>5</sup> Over the years, it has evolved from a primarily military model to incorporate police and civilians into a complex model.<sup>6</sup> Peacekeeping is accomplished with the consent of the parties to the conflict.”<sup>7</sup>

Related to peacekeeping is peacebuilding, which refers to activities that seek “to establish the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations” to avoid a relapse into conflict.<sup>8</sup> It seeks to address the structural causes of violent conflict by addressing core issues effecting the society and State functioning.<sup>9</sup>

Two other closely related missions are nation building and state building. Nation building often refers to the process of using the power of the state to construct or structure a national identity to remain politically stable and viable in the future, such as the case when colonial powers carved out new nations in Africa.<sup>10</sup> As Francis Fukuyama highlights, nation building is difficult to for outsiders to accomplish, since a nation is defined by a “community of shared values, traditions and historical memory.”<sup>11</sup>

For the purpose of this paper, the term state building will describe a deliberate effort by a foreign power to construct or install the institutions of a national government, according to a model that may be more familiar to the foreign power but is often considered foreign, and even destabilizing.<sup>12 13</sup> It involves the use of armed forces as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.<sup>14</sup> It can be defined as the phase of operations that occurs post conflict and straddles an area between conventional war fighting and traditional development assistance. These operations require a mix of skills and training to address a range of issues, including establishing public security and the rule of law, facilitating political transition, rebuilding infrastructure, and jumpstarting economic recovery. These missions must often operate in more demanding, often hostile, environments versus peace building programs.<sup>15</sup>

It is worthy to note that there is a spectrum of approaches to reform a violent society into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. Near one end is co-option (peace building) and the other is deconstruction (state building). In the first case, the intervening authorities tries to work within the existing institution and deal with all social forces and power centers to redirect their ongoing competition for power and wealth from violent to peaceful channels. In the second, intervening authorities first dismantle an existing state apparatus and build a new one, in the process consciously disempowering some element of society and empowering others.<sup>16</sup>

This paper will focus on state building, specifically related to post conflict. To distinguish ordinary military interventions from state building efforts, there are three strict criteria.<sup>17</sup> First, the goal of intervention, or at least the practical effect, must be regime change or survival of a regime that would otherwise collapse.<sup>18</sup> The second criterion is the deployment of large numbers of ground troops. While there are a few examples where intervening authorities have not used ground troops, state building generally requires the long-term commitment of ground forces, not just to fight but often to perform essential administrative functions such as establishing law and order. The final criterion is the use of military and civilian personnel in the political administration of target counties.<sup>19</sup>

#### United States History of State Building

Up until 2000, there have been 24 cases in which the U.S. applied force specifically to create new governmental systems. In each episode, the U.S. placed land forces in the area, made a conscious effort to affect local politics in the direction of promoting democracy and left. The results indicate that U.S. military intervention left

behind a successful democracy in only eight cases, or 33 percent of the time (reference Figure 1).<sup>20</sup>

<b>Nation-Building Military Occupations by the United States</b> 1850-2000		
Austria	1945-55	success
Cuba	1898-1902	failure
Cuba	1906-1909	failure
Cuba	1917-22	failure
Dominican Republic	1911-24	failure
Dominican Republic	1965-67	failure
Haiti	1915-34	failure
Haiti	1994-96	failure
Honduras	1924	failure
Italy	1943-45	success
Japan	1945-52	success
Lebanon	1958	failure
Lebanon	1982-84	failure
Mexico	1914-17	failure
Nicaragua	1912-25	failure
Nicaragua	1926-33	failure
Nicaragua	1926-33	failure
Panama	1903-33	failure
Panama	1989-1995	success
Philippines	1898-1946	success
Somalia	1992-94	failure
South Korea	1945-61	failure
West Germany	1945-52	success

Figure 1. Military Occupation, U.S.<sup>21</sup>

While there are many reasons for past failed attempts at state building, one reason is that very few people, in particular the military who often was in charge of the mission, know how to do it.<sup>22</sup> The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has made concentrated efforts to eradicate lack of guidance, as will be discussed in the section on evaluation.<sup>23</sup> In addition, mismatches between inputs, as measured in personnel and money, and desired outcomes, as measured in imposed social transformation, were another cause for failure of nation building efforts.<sup>24</sup> Another reason, as will be

discussed in the Afghanistan and Iraq cases, are ill defined goals and inconsistent evaluations.

### Evaluating State Building

Successful evaluation of a program provides the best information on the key policy questions within the given set of real-world constraints. However, all evaluations are flawed if measured against a notion of abstract perfection, or if judged without taking time, budget, ethical, and political restriction into account. “Merely” successful evaluation (versus perfect) occurs when the evaluation provides better information than would have otherwise been available.<sup>25</sup> In state building efforts, achieving successful evaluations is still largely a goal and not reality, due to the difficulties of building and implementing assessments.

### Developing an Assessment

A core challenge in developing a state building assessment is identifying the decisions that need assessment support. To understand the decision that need to be made, one must identify the activities, enumerate the stakeholders for those activities, and carefully match stakeholders’ decisional needs with appropriate levels and types of evaluation. A RAND study identified several challenges in evaluating state building:

- Determining causality,
- Lack of well articulated intermediate goals,
- Assessment capabilities of stakeholders,
- Multiplicity of and differing priorities of stakeholders,
- Tracking systems not organized for assessment,
- Confusing terminology,

- “Passing the buck” on assessments,
- Expectations and preconceived notions of assessment.<sup>26</sup>

### Implementing State Building Assessment

State building evaluations are more complex and challenging than evaluations in many other fields. As a result, there have been more sector-specific evaluations recently: peace education, security sector reform, rule of law, etc. Focusing on the three areas where state building is different, process, content, and context, helps to develop uniqueness in state building evaluation while capitalizing on good practices from the general evaluation discipline.<sup>27</sup>

The process for evaluating state building is similar to other fields, in that evaluations should tailor criteria used for evaluation (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and coherence) to the field. However, state building evaluations should use three additional criteria: linkages, coverage, and conflict sensitivity. Evaluations should compare evaluations with standards to determine the value of the achievement. However, in state building, there are not clear standards of comparison. Therefore, quality evaluation must be used to determine the value of the achievement. The context of state building is also unique due to three conflict and post-conflict environment challenges. First, accessing key people can be very difficult because of security conditions. Second, evaluators must maintain sensitivity to context because of ethnic, gender, and other possible clashes that could reignite conflict. Third, evaluations should do no harm and ensure the safety of the participants, which also may be more difficult in a post conflict environment in which security is often lacking.<sup>28</sup>

To assist in measuring progress, the USIP developed a metrics framework entitled “Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) Metrics Framework.”<sup>29</sup> The manual provides a comprehensive capability for measuring progress during stabilization and reconstruction operations, by enabling policymakers to establish a baseline even before intervention begins, and track progress.<sup>30</sup> The MPICE Metrics Framework groups goals into five sectors, Safe and Secure Environment, Social Well Being, Sustainable Economy, Rule of Law and Political Moderation and Stable Governance, with goal each being assigned indicators, which describe the concept to be evaluated and measures, which describe the empirical data to be collected.<sup>31</sup>

Since the goals established in the MPICE Metrics Framework are generic, policy makers can tailor them to specific policy goals, conflict dynamics, and cultural peculiarities. However, even with established goals, policy makers often face constrained resources (money, manning, time, etc), and must make decision on what takes priority. The next section will address this issue.

### Hierarchy of Evaluation

Authorities in designing, implementing, and appraising social programs through evaluation, Peter Rossi, Mark Lipsey, and Howard Freeman developed a hierarchy of evaluation to provide a framework for evaluating state building efforts, (see Figure 2).<sup>32</sup>






Figure 2. The Hierarchy of Evaluation<sup>33</sup>

### Level 1: Assessment of Need for the Program

Level 1 is foundational in many respects. It is the assessment of the need for the program or activity. Here evaluation connects most explicitly with target ends or goals. Evaluation at this level focuses on the problem to be solved or the goal to be met, the population to be served, and the kinds of services that might contribute to a solution.<sup>34</sup> Key to success in being able to evaluate state building is to have a defined set of goals that are agreed upon by all participants. Because state building normally involves multiple organizations, and often multiple nations, agreeing on goals is important, as is defining the priorities of goals. The next two sections will discuss priorities as well as some international organizations generic goals.

#### State Building Priorities

In their book, “Beginners Guide to Nation Building,” Dobbins, James, Crane and DeGrasse lay out priorities for state building, which is foundational to establishing basic goals. The first priorities should be public security and humanitarian assistance. If most basic human needs are not met, any money or effort spent on political or economic

development likely to be wasted. Their hierarchy of tasks, depicted in figure 3, lists security at the most essential priority and moves to development in descending priority order. The hierarchy is not intended as a sequential task list. However, inadequately resourcing if a higher priority is likely result in wasted investment in lower-order priorities.<sup>35</sup>




Figure 3. The Hierarchy of Evaluation<sup>36</sup>

The USIP built on these priorities, and developed a framework in “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” to aid a whole of government approach to plan and execute stability and reconstruction missions. The framework provides a foundation in order to determine priorities with and based on the needs of the host nation, by listing end states as well as cross-cutting principles, as illustrated in figure 4.<sup>37</sup> In addition to providing end states, the framework provides a strategy for resolving conflicts between objectives through understanding high-level trade-offs, such as

stability versus host nation legitimacy or expediency versus sustainability. Finally, the framework provides three fundamental focus priorities for societies emerging from conflict: sources of conflict and stability, implementation of a political settlement and provision of services that meet basic human needs.

#### Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction




Figure 4. USIP Strategic Framework<sup>38</sup>

In addition to guidance from USIP, many other organizations have established goals related to state building and peace building efforts. Three organizations prevalent in international state and nation building efforts are the World Bank, Institute for Economics and Peace, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). These organizations' goals as well as a few multinational goals, are discussed next.

#### International Peace Goals

The first organization prominent in development efforts is the World Bank. In their report, "World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development," the World Bank drew on a wide range review of existing data to develop common factors

that underpin successful transitions of countries out of fragile conditions. The report states that these transitions rarely have occurred without achieving the following priorities: citizen security, justice, jobs, better governance through legitimate institutions and reduced external stress.<sup>39</sup>

The next organization is the Institute for Economics and Peace, who analyzed the Global Peace Index to define the key economic, political, and cultural determinants that led to more peaceful societies. The institute defined eight beneficial and mutually reinforcing factors associated with peaceful environments: well functioning government, sound business environment, equitable distribution of resources, acceptance of the rights of others, good relations with neighbors, free flow of information, high levels of education, and low levels of corruption. The institute emphasized that peace building efforts should aim at enhancing and building these structures as much as possible while dealing with security provisions, a critical provision to state building, as highlighted by Dobbins, et al.<sup>40</sup>

The third organization is USAID, which is the U.S. State Department agency primarily responsible for administering civilian aid. The organization developed seven core development objectives: increase food security, promote global health and strong health systems, reduce climate change impacts and promote low emissions growth, promote sustainable, broad-based economic growth, expand and sustain the ranks of stable, prosperous, and democratic states, provide humanitarian assistance and support disaster mitigation, and prevent and respond to crises, conflict, and instability: applying development approaches in fragile and conflict-affected states. In addition, they have seven operating principles to focus their efforts:

- Promote gender equality and female empowerment,
- Apply science, technology, and innovation strategically,
- Apply selectivity and focus,
- Measure and evaluate impact,
- Build in sustainability from the start,
- Apply integrated approaches to development,
- Leverage “solution holders” and partner strategically.<sup>41</sup>

These principles align with the U.S. strategy to meet U.N. Millennium Development Goals.

In September 2000, 189 countries, including 147 heads of state, signed the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The eight goals and related targets (listed in figure 5) form a blueprint to assist in meeting the needs of the world’s poorest countries by 2015.<sup>42</sup>

CURRENT MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS	
<b>Goal 1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>	<p>Target: Halve the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day.</p> <p>Target: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people.</p> <p>Target: Halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.</p>
<b>Goal 2 Achieve universal primary education</b>	<p>Target: Ensure that all children will be able to complete a full course of primary education.</p>
<b>Goal 3 Promote gender equality and empower women</b>	<p>Target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education.</p>
<b>Goal 4 Reduce child mortality</b>	<p>Target: Reduce, by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.</p>
<b>Goal 5 Improve Maternal health</b>	<p>Target: Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio.</p>
<b>Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</b>	<p>Target: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.</p> <p>Target: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it.</p> <p>Target: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.</p>
<b>Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability</b>	<p>Target: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.</p> <p>Target: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate loss.</p> <p>Target: Halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.</p> <p>Target: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers.</p>
<b>Goal 8 Develop a global partnership for development</b>	<p>Target: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and finance system.</p> <p>Target: Address the special needs of the least developed countries.</p> <p>Target: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States.</p> <p>Target: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries.</p> <p>Target: Provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries.</p> <p>Target: Make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.</p>

Figure 5. Millennium Development Goals<sup>43</sup>

In 2011, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding developed Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG) as a set of interim goals for addressing structural causes of conflict and fragility, and as a precursor to meeting the Millennium Development Goals.<sup>44</sup> The PSGs are legitimate politics (foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution), security (establish and strengthen people's security), justice (address injustice and increase people's access to justice), economic foundations (general employment and improve livelihoods), and revenue and services (manage revenue and build capacity for accountability and fair service delivery.)<sup>45</sup>

While different organizations have many goals and priorities, there is considerable amount of common ground among frameworks:

- All states can manage revenues and perform core functions effectively and accountably,
- All social groups can participate in the decisions that affect society,
- All social groups have equal access to justice,
- All social groups have access to fair, accountable social service delivery,
- All social groups feel secure,
- The international community is effectively addressing the external stresses that led to conflict.

All the different goals lead to the questions of whose goals are correct and who decides what the strategy and objective should be. These questions are beyond the scope of this paper, but need to be addressed in planning stages, preferable during pre-conflict planning in the case of state building.

#### Level 2: Assessment of Design and Theory

Assessment of the concept, design, and theory is the second level in the Rossi, et al. hierarchy. Once a needs assessment establishes there is a problem or policy goal to pursue as well as the intended objectives of such policy, different solutions can be considered. Here theory connects the ways, also known as strategy, to the ends, that is, the goals.<sup>46</sup> An example of an assessment at this level is the U.N. Strategic Assessment.

The U.N. developed a guide for formal strategic assessments of political crisis, conflict or post-conflict situation. The U.N. Strategic Assessment is a tool for strategic

analysis and options for U.N. engagements in conflict-affected countries. Their strategic assessments provide a mechanism for cutting across the political, security, development, humanitarian, and human rights aspects of the U.N.'s work. While originally developed as an assessment tool, the guide also includes a methodical method that can be used to determine objectives, which can then be used for additional long-term measuring and monitoring. Currently, these assessments are normally only conducted when triggered by need to formulate (or reformulate) strategy, such as a drastic change in circumstances or when there is a sense that the U.N. is underperforming.<sup>47</sup> To date, however, only a few countries, including Haiti and Timor-Leste, have completed Country Integrated Strategic Frameworks to assess their strategies and programs.

### Level 3: Assessment of Process and Implementation

The third level in the hierarchy of evaluation focuses on program operations and the execution of the elements prescribed by the theory and design at Level Two. A program can be perfectly executed but still not achieve its goals if the design were inadequate. Conversely, poor execution can foil the most brilliant design.<sup>48</sup>

Berkey and Ross provide seven steps to evaluate ongoing programs.<sup>49</sup> The first step is to review if the program is reaching the appropriate beneficiaries. The next step is to see if the program is being properly delivered. That is, determine if there is program integrity research. The third stage addresses fiscal accountability, and asks if funds are being used appropriately. Stage four and five are related, asking if the effectiveness can be estimated ("evaluability"), and if so, is it effective? (Is the program working?) Stage six ties in effectiveness and funding under cost effectiveness: Is the



program worth it. Finally, stage seven tackles trying to put the findings into a larger context.<sup>50</sup>

To answer these questions, they discuss several types of evaluation designs:

- Randomized experiments,
- Regression discontinuity (assignment by observed variables),
- Interrupted time series,
- Cross Sectional Designs,
- Pooled cross sectional and time series designs (panels).<sup>51</sup>

A few of these methods, in particular interrupted regression discontinuity and cross sectional design will be used in the Afghanistan and Iraq case studies later in the paper.

#### Level 4: Assessment of Outcomes and Effects

Level four, near the top of the evaluation hierarchy, concerns outcomes and effects. At this level, outputs are translated into outcomes, level of performance, or achievements. Thus, outputs are the products of program activities, outcomes are the changes resulting from the projects. This is the first level of assessment at which solutions to the problem that originally motivated the program can be seen.<sup>52</sup> In state building, this is the level where one begins to see if the state can function as desired, preferably on its own.

#### Level 5: Assessment of Cost-Effectiveness

The assessment of cost-effectiveness is at the top of the evaluation hierarchy at Level Five. Only when desired outcomes are at least partially observed can efforts be made to assess their cost-effectiveness. Evaluations at this level are often most attractive in bottom-line terms, but they depend heavily on lower levels of evaluation.<sup>53</sup>

The hierarchy of evaluation can be a powerful tool for appropriately matching types of assessment with specific stakeholder needs. Each level of the evaluation hierarchy implies a set of generic security cooperation assessment questions, the answers to which will differ considerably, depending on the program's nature, the authorities of the stakeholders, and so forth.

To illustrate strategy and relation to evaluation, this paper reviews U.S. led conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the next section. The case studies will focus on levels four and five of the hierarchy.

### Afghanistan Case Study

#### Overview

Afghanistan became a key Cold War battleground after the Soviet troops invaded to support a pro-communist regime 1979. After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, a series of subsequent civil wars resulted in the Taliban gaining control of approximately 90 percent of the country in 1996.<sup>54</sup> Other than providing humanitarian assistance to the country, Afghanistan was not a priority for the U.S. until the Taliban attacked on September 11, 2001. In October 2011, after the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, the U.S. began military operations.<sup>55</sup> The initial focus of operations was to disrupt, defeat and destroy Al Qaeda and other terrorist organization and infrastructure. In addition, the military was to support humanitarian aid; however, there was not any initial focus on conducting stability operations.<sup>56</sup>

By the end of December 2001, the U.S. and its allies toppled the Taliban and worked a political agreement negotiated with a wide spectrum of Afghan leaders.<sup>57</sup> The December 2001 Bonn Agreement laid the foundation for the reconstruction of the Afghan state and supported the set up of an International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF), which deployed under U.N. Resolution 1386.<sup>58</sup> Thus, in 2002, U.S. focus began to include state building. Four factor hindered U.S. efforts, however: lack of an adequate interagency plan, continued focus on fighting terrorists versus state building, limited information sharing due to security concerns, and resource constraints.<sup>59</sup>

As antigovernment violence increased in 2005, the U.S. and other international actors decided that improving governance was central to fighting the growing insurgency. Police reform became a crucial element of sector security reform (SSR). The U.S. refocused its military efforts onto Afghan army and police reform; however, U.S. efforts were hampered due to lack of internal coordination stemming from the Foreign Assistance Act of December 1974, which prohibited foreign assistance funds for training foreign government law enforcement forces.<sup>60</sup> Additionally, multiple countries were investing in the field and lacked coordination, resulting in the lack of a common vision and lack of information sharing. The situation did not improve until 2008, when the Internal Police Coordination Board (IPCB) began to coordinate efforts.<sup>61</sup>

More than two decades of conflict destroyed much of Afghanistan's limited infrastructure and disrupted normal patterns of economic activity. Although the country's economic outlook has improved significantly and is showing signs of recovery since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The economy is highly dependent on foreign aid and agriculture, which is extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions, especially drought.<sup>62</sup>

### Success or Failure?

Though efforts in Afghanistan are ongoing, the paper will next review efforts in Afghanistan via three methods: reviewing inputs and outputs, stakeholders' opinion, and the main U.S. focus, the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

## Inputs and Outputs

One way to assess the effectiveness of U.S. efforts at state building in Afghanistan is to review the program's inputs and outputs. Ideally, assessing the effectiveness of a program occurs concurrently with the efforts. However, in reviewing the input and output, this paper essentially uses a quasi regression discontinuity design, where the casual effects can be loosely associated with the state building efforts.

Two primary U.S. inputs were personnel, examined in terms of the lives (i.e., the death toll) and money (i.e, the financial cost of the operation). During the first nine years of the war in Afghanistan, nearly 1,000 U.S. military personnel died. That figured doubled in just 27 months after the U.S. adopted the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and sent an additional 33,000 troops into Afghanistan.<sup>63</sup> The number of military coalition deaths totaled 3,257 as of February 13. (See Table 1 for the yearly military fatality totals in Afghanistan.)

Table 1. Yearly Coalition Military Fatalities in Afghanistan (as of January 2013)<sup>64</sup>

Year	US	UK	Other	Total
2001	12	0	0	12
2002	49	3	18	70
2003	48	0	10	58
2004	52	1	7	60
2005	99	1	31	131
2006	98	39	54	191
2007	117	42	73	232
2008	155	51	89	295
2009	317	108	96	521
2010	499	103	109	711
2011	418	46	102	566
2012	310	44	48	402
2013	3	2	3	8
Total	2177	440	640	3257

In addition to the number of expended lives, a March 2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported that following the Afghanistan surge announcement in 2009, Defense Department spending on Afghanistan increased 50%, going from \$4.4 billion to \$6.7 billion a month. Additionally, the CRS also noted the total operational cost for Afghanistan from the beginning of the conflict in 2001 through 2006 only slightly exceeded the amount spent in 2010 alone – \$93.8 billion. The projected total cost relating to Afghanistan from inception to fiscal year 2011 was over \$450 billion.<sup>65</sup>

The second portion of this type of review is the output. Several organizations track status of countries' governance, freedom, etc. Six report results are below.

The World Bank publishes the World Wide Governance Indicators (WGI) report on six aggregate governance indicators, covering Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption within a country. The country is assessed with a percentile rank on each of the six governance indicators. Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rank lower than the indicated country. Thus, higher values indicate better governance scores. The assessment includes margins of error based on 90 percent confidence intervals (CI). Therefore, changes over time that stay in the CI are not considered significant.<sup>66</sup> Based on a compilation of sources (from a low of eight in "Political Stability and Absence of Violence" to a maximum of 22 in "Rule of Law"), none of the categories showed significant overall change from 2000 to 2012.<sup>67 68</sup>

Another organization to report on countries is CountryWatch (CW), which calculates the country's Political Risk of countries using the following criteria: political

stability, political representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, and corruption. CW assigns scores from zero to ten, with a score of ten marking the lowest political risk. In 2012, Afghanistan received a score of two, retaining its low ranking from previous years.<sup>69</sup> Additionally, CW publishes a Political Stability Index based on the country's record of peaceful transitions of power, and the ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies in relation to credible risks of government collapse.<sup>70</sup> The index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability, with a score of zero marking the lowest level of political stability and a score of ten marking the highest level. In 2012, Afghanistan received a score of two.<sup>71</sup>

A third report is by Freedom House, which quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a combined index for each country. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results, with a score of one represents the freest countries while seven represents the least free. Most recently, Afghanistan scored a six in Political Rights as well as Civil Liberties, indicating that overall, the country is not free. The rating also reflected that there was no change compared to past reports.<sup>72</sup>

Since 1990, the UN Development Programme has compiled the Human Development Index (HDI), which measures the quality of life in countries across the world. The HDI is a composite of several indicators that measure a country's achievements in three main areas of human development: longevity, education, and economic standard of living. Although the concept of human development is complicated and cannot be properly captured by values and indices, the HDI offers a

wide-ranging assessment.<sup>73</sup> In 2011, Afghanistan ranked 155th out of 169 countries, placing it in the “Low Human Development” category.<sup>74</sup>

In 2012, Afghanistan tied Somalia and North Korea in Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI), tying for the world's most-corrupt country countries (174 out of 174 indexed.)<sup>75</sup> (The CPI indicates the perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory.) Afghanistan's rating has declined significantly since 2005, the first year it was indexed, when it tied with eight other countries at 117 of 158.<sup>76</sup>

Fund for Peace produced the fourth report covered here, which reports conflict assessments to focus on the problems of weak and failing states. As part of their mission, they produce an annual report on several countries, compiling indicators and assessments under groupings of Social and Economic Indicators, Political and Military Indicators, and State Institutions and Civil Society.<sup>77</sup> Five of the areas under Social and Economic Indicators remain unchanged over the past five years: Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, and Uneven Development. Only one area, Poverty and Decline, has improved in the past five years. Even with the improvement, however, a third of the population is still under the poverty line. The country also has some of the lowest health indicators in the world. Additionally, the lack of even development has affected the country's progress negatively and despite some small economic progress, Afghanistan continues to rank among the poorest nations in the world.<sup>78</sup>

Under Political and Military Indicators, four areas, Legitimacy of the State, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, and Factionalized Elites, have worsened over the

past five years, while two areas, Public Services and External Intervention, have remained unchanged. With a largely nomadic and tribal-based society, the central government wields little authority over the majority of its territory. Due to this lack of control, armed groups and criminal syndicates have flourished. Additionally, there has been little infrastructure development, such as public services, primarily roads, and other transit routes. Finally, despite the presence of foreign militaries, antigovernment militias and Taliban violence is widespread.<sup>79</sup> One last area to review in the Funds for Peace reports is State Institutions and Civil Society indicators. Out of seven core areas, one area, civil service, is poor, but four others are weak: leadership, judiciary, civil service, and media. On the positive side, the police were rated as moderate and military was encouragingly rated as good.<sup>80</sup>

In 2008, the Brookings Institute created the “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World,” which ranks and assesses 141 countries in fulfilling four core functions of statehood: providing security, maintaining legitimate political institutions, fostering equitable economic growth, and meeting their people’s human needs. Similar to other results, Afghanistan ranks second to worst, and is considered failing to fulfill any core state function. With scores from 0.0 (worst) to 10.0 (best), Afghanistan received a score of 1.65 overall, with the core functional scores of Economics - 4.51, Political - 2.08, Security- 0.0 and Social Welfare – 0.0.<sup>81</sup>

Finally, the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan provides an assessment of achieving MDGs. Because of its lost decades and the lack of available information, Afghanistan has defined its MDG contribution as targets for 2020 from baselines of 2002 to 2005, versus the majority of countries that use 2015 as a goal.



Despite extreme poverty, ill health, and hunger, Afghans define the lack of security as their greatest problem. Hence the government of Afghanistan has added this new goal to the eight global MDGs recognizing the critical role of peace and security in achieving the other MDGs.<sup>82</sup> According to the UNDP Afghanistan, considerable progress has been made to recruit, train and support the Afghan National Army; however, there is concern for maintaining reforms.<sup>83</sup> Many of the other goals are difficult to assess due to lack of data. However, they all report limited progress, or, at best, slow growth. For example, progress towards increasing primary school completion rates for girls is “seriously off track,” infant and under-five mortality rates are third highest in the world, and data indicates that 20 percent of rural households are chronically food insecure, with another 18 percent facing seasonal food shortages.

### Afghan Security Forces

The centerpiece of focus President Obama's revised Afghanistan strategy has been enhancing the ANSF capabilities, including military and police, to transfer security responsibility back to Afghan forces and withdraw from the country.<sup>84</sup> Assessment of the ANSF is the fifth, and top level, of Rossi, et al. hierarchy of assessments.

While several surveys from previous section indicate some improvement in the capabilities, both the army and police still have significant issues.

Inefficiency and endemic corruption plagues the Afghan army. Moreover, desertion has been a significant problem. A recent Special Inspector General for Afghan Report found that only 60 to 80 percent of Afghan soldiers are present for duty at any time due to desertion or injury. Moreover, a Pentagon report in October 2011 placed the desertion numbers between 2,400 and 5,500 a month.<sup>85</sup>

The Afghan National Police provide support to the Afghan Army. “Attempts to build a credible Afghan police force were faltering badly,” according to NATO officials.<sup>86</sup> Three major areas of concern are Taliban infiltration, incompetence/illiteracy, and corruption.<sup>87</sup> In addition, drugs are a major concern, with approximately 17 percent testing positive for illegal drugs.<sup>88 89</sup> The final area for concern is officer retention, with up to a quarter of the officers quitting every year, making the Afghan government’s goals substantially difficult to achieve.<sup>90</sup>

The Afghan efforts have yielded some results toward SSR, especially with regard to the buildup of the police and army, even though U.S. efforts were hampered due to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act mentioned earlier. However, it remains to be seen if the creation of ANSF will permit a peaceful withdrawal of foreign military forces. Even in best case scenario, though, Afghanistan will have to manage complex security entities and a weak semi-democratic government unable to uphold the rule of law.<sup>91</sup>

### Afghan Opinion

The final area, and some would say most critical, to assess is the effectiveness of the program according to the primary stakeholders, the Afghan population.

On November 14, 2012, The Asia Foundation released the findings from its most recent Afghanistan public opinion poll, which covered all 34 provinces in the country. *Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People* is the eighth annual poll conducted by The Asia Foundation. Collectively, the surveys establish an accurate, long-term barometer of public opinion across Afghanistan to assess the mood and direction of the country.<sup>92</sup>




Figure 6. Afghanistan's Population's Opinion of Country's Overall Direction<sup>93</sup>

The survey respondents pointed to insecurity as the biggest problem facing the country, with just over half of the respondents, 52 percent, saying the country was moving in the right direction versus 46 percent the year before and 44 percent in 2010.<sup>94</sup> The primary issues cited as problems were security (28 percent), unemployment (27 percent), and corruption (25 percent).

Other key findings of the survey include:

- Afghans report improvements over the past year in overall household financial wellbeing and access to schools.
- Afghans express confidence in local government capacity and cite limited but growing confidence in central government institutions.
- Development efforts most visible to Afghans are related to education and reconstruction/building of roads and bridges.

- Afghans agree that women and men should have equal opportunities in education and employment but are divided on the issue of women's political participation.<sup>95</sup>

### Summary

Though directly related to the September 2011 attacks, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan while focused on Iraq. As a result, initial efforts to rebuild the state after the defeat of the Taliban were limited. The U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, along with participation by allies, eventually began to produce some results, especially with the Afghan Security Forces. However, the efforts suffered from the initial lack of focus, fragmented efforts, and a lack of coordinated efforts, especially with respect to the reformation of the police.

As the U.S. nears the deadline to withdraw combat forces in 2014, reports and surveys indicate limited, at best, progress in many social, financial, and governmental areas. Of particular note, several indicators suggest improvements to the ANSF, which is a strong precursor to withdrawing, though there are still concerns over recruiting, training, and retaining security forces. In addition, public opinion also seems to indicate the country is moving in a positive direction.

### Iraq Case Study

#### Overview

A U.S.-led coalition forces attacked Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003 with the goal of toppling Saddam Hussein's regime, removing all weapons of mass (WMD) destruction from Iraq and halting Iraq's support for al-Qaida and other terrorist networks.<sup>96</sup> By May 1, 2003, U.S. ended the military invasion and began a military occupation. The Bush administration erroneously assumed, however, that Iraq was a

strong state and that once Saddam's regime was overthrown, there would be a relative level of stability.<sup>97</sup>

On June 8, 2004, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) adopted 1546, which endorsed the new Interim Government of Iraq, established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), and called upon the international community to aid Iraq in its transition.<sup>98</sup> NTM-I initial goal was to create effective armed forces, but expanded their training over the next few years to include gendarmerie-type training for the federal police to bridge the gap between routine police work and military operations.<sup>99</sup> The final U.S. troops left on December 18, 2011 when the NTM-I mission ended due to the expiration of the legal protection on December 31.<sup>100</sup>

At the surface level, the Coalition Provisional Authority, established on April 21, 2003, created a political settlement that led to an Iraqi constitution and elected government based on democratic premises. Even though Iraq held two democratic elections, progress has been severely limited, with little improvement to the economic sector and a volatile security situation remaining.<sup>101</sup>

### Success or Failure?

The U.S. military officially withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011, yet there is still debate over if their state building efforts were successful. Using a similar approach in the Afghanistan Case, the paper will next review efforts in Iraq via two methods: reviewing inputs and outputs and stakeholders' opinion.

#### Inputs and Outputs

Using a quasi regression discontinuity design again, the inputs (in terms of money and lives) can be compared to the outcome to associate loosely casual effects of the U.S. state building efforts.

By the end of the Iraq occupation the U.S. war cost, including costs of the operations, diplomatic operations, and medical care for veterans, is more than \$820 billion.<sup>102</sup> The U.K. also spent over £4.55 billion (\$9 billion).<sup>103</sup> In addition, 4,485 U.S. troops were killed and over 32,000 were wounded.<sup>104 105</sup>

Table 2. Yearly Coalition Military Fatalities in Iraq (as of Jan 12)<sup>106</sup>

Year	US	UK	Other	Total
2003	486	53	41	580
2004	849	22	35	906
2005	846	23	28	897
2006	823	29	21	873
2007	904	47	10	961
2008	314	4	4	322
2009	149	1	0	150
2010	60	0	0	60
2011	54	0	0	54
Total	4485	179	139	4803

Beyond the deaths of coalition troops, more than 10,125 Iraqi military and police and between 100,000-400,000 civilians were killed.<sup>107</sup> Finally, over two million Iraqis, nearly five percent of the population, were displaced by 2011.<sup>108</sup>

The same sources from the Afghanistan Case study are next reviewed to report outputs of state building efforts. The second portion of this type of review is the output.<sup>109</sup>

- WGI: The six areas covered in this report, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption, are more promising in Iraq than Afghanistan, though still very limited.<sup>110</sup> Only two areas, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption, indicate no significant changes from 2002 to 2011. The

- remaining four areas show improvement; however, all remain low and under 20 percent, ranking them low compared to the majority of other countries.<sup>111</sup>
- CW Indicators: Indicators on Political Risk and Political Stability for Iraq are also better than Afghanistan, though Iraq scores are still low. In 2012, Iraq received a score of three and a half for both Political Risk and Political Stability (versus the two Afghan received).<sup>112</sup>
  - Freedom House Rankings: The assessment for 2012 listed Iraq's Political Rights at five, which is an upward trend from the last survey, indicating increase in political rights, and Civil Liberties at six. (Afghanistan scored six in both categories.) Though there was an upward trend in Political Rights, Iraq's Freedom Status is still categorized as "Not Free."<sup>113</sup>
  - HDI: Iraq's ranking for human development, including longevity, education, and economic standard of living, was 132 out of 169 countries (compared to Afghanistan's rank of 155), placing Iraq in the "Low Human Development" category as well.<sup>114</sup>
  - CPI Indices: In 2012, Iraq is 169 out of 174 in Transparency International's annual index of corruption perceptions.<sup>115</sup> (Afghanistan was tied at 174.) Of note, the first year Transparency International indexed Iraq in 2003, it was 113 of 133, tying with Congo, Ecuador, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.<sup>116</sup>
  - Fund for Peace Country Index - Social and Economic Indicators: Of the seven categories, two remain unchanged over the past five years: Group Grievance, Uneven Development, and Poverty. However, the following areas have improved over the past five years: Demographic Pressures, Refugees and

Internally Displaced Persons, and Human Flight. Although Iraq showed slight improvements over its 2010 scores, it continues to rank very poorly on its social and economic indicators. Violence due to strong fractures between ethnic, political, and religious groups influence a particularly low score in Group Grievance, and places intense pressure on the population, forcing many to abandon the country and adversely affects the nation's economic figures.<sup>117</sup>

- Fund for Peace Country Index - Political and Military Indicators: In the past five years, only the Security Apparatus and Factionalized Elites areas have remained unchanged in this group while the remaining four areas, Legitimacy of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, and External Intervention, have improved. Fund for Peace continues to consider Iraq as one of the world's most dangerous countries due to a weak and troubled central government. With militias and other pressure groups undermining the government and security forces, security conditions are amongst the worst in the region as well. Widespread corruption and a poor human rights record characterize Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq's ethnically and religiously fragmented society gives rise to a fractured government. Iraq also continues to depend substantially on foreign assistance.<sup>118</sup>
- Fund for Peace Country Index - State Institutions and Civil Society: Of their core indicators in this area, Leadership, Military, Police, Judiciary, Civil Service, Civil Society, and Media, none are listed as poor, compared with Afghanistan. However, leadership, police, judiciary, civil service, and media



are still listed as weak and one are, civil society, is moderate. Encouragingly, however, Fund for Peace categorized military as good, as opposed to Afghanistan, where none were listed as good.<sup>119</sup>

- Brookings Institute – Index of State Weakness: Similar to Afghanistan, Iraq is ranked as the fourth worst country out of 141 for weakest states. The four core functions were rated as Economics – 2.87, Political – 1.67, and Security – 1.63. Of note, Iraq scored 6.27 for Social Welfare, placing that function in the second quintile among other countries. The overall score for Iraq though, was still only 3.11, well within the overall scores for the bottom quintile.<sup>120</sup>
- Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): In a press release on August 2010, the U.N. and Government Iraq reported on progress towards achieving the four of the eight MDGs in Iraq. The areas showing progress were reducing hunger and child mortality and promoting gender equality. For example, child mortality for children under five has fallen from 62 to 41 per 1,000 live births. However, the report cited slower progress in four other crucial areas: enrollment in primary education, unemployment and access to safe and reliable water and sanitation services. For example, youth unemployment is double the national average at 30 percent, and more than half of Iraqi children do not complete primary education on time.<sup>121</sup>

### Iraqi Opinion

International Republican Institute (IRI) has completed a general opinion survey of Iraq since 2003. On November 27, 2012, IRI released its latest survey results from its most recent survey conducted in September 2012.<sup>122</sup> The survey indicated 87 percent

wanted their provincial councils to have more authority than the federal government. Also, 80 percent believed the federal and provincial governments did not work well together. The country's greatest problems cited in the survey were lack of water, electricity, and security.<sup>123</sup>

Largely unchanged from the 2010, where 57 percent thought the government was heading in the wrong direction, 55 percent of the respondents across all 18 provinces believed that Iraq as a whole was going in the wrong direction in 2012.<sup>124</sup> However, the results were not consistent through the various provinces. The perception on the overall economic situation was positive among respondents with 56 percent stating the situation was either good or very good.<sup>125</sup>

### Summary

Although the U.S. never found WMD, it invaded Iraq with a primary intent to halt proliferation of WMD in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The U.S. severely misjudged the efforts to turn Iraq into a democratically ruled state after they toppled Saddam's regime. The U.S. and its allies faced similar challenges in Iraq as they did in Afghanistan, including ensuring security and installing a notion of rule of law.

Though the U.S. underestimated the post conflict state building requirements after they invaded Iraq, various reports indicate some progress in returning the country to a functioning state. Most reports indicate an improvement in most areas. While there are more signs of improvement in Iraq than Afghanistan, the improvements have been limited, and the country still faces security issues and suffers from internal violence. Additionally, the populace feels the overall situation in the country is improving.

## Mali Case Study

### Overview

In March 2012, soldiers in Bamako, the capital of Mali, rose up in a coup and overthrew the president. The coup was largely due to the government's mishandling of a rebellion by nomadic Tuareg rebels in the vast northern desert. Shortly after the coup, however, the Tuareg rebels seized much of the north. Eventually, Islamist extremists pushed out the Tuaregs.<sup>126</sup>

Over the past year, upheaval in the government and military left the Malian Army without firm leadership and unable to defend Mali's northern desert region, which has become an enclave and training ground for radical jihadi factions, including al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.<sup>127</sup> In December 2012, the UNSC unanimously approved a resolution to send thousands of African troops into Mali to help oust Islamist extremists.<sup>128</sup> However, no troops engaged until the next year in January, when the Islamists took over a frontier town that had been the de facto line of government control. Worried that there was little to stop the militants from storming ever further into Mali, France intervened on January 11, 2013 by sending armed forces into combat. By late January, the French forces had reclaimed a series of northern cities and towns from the Islamists. Questions remained if they would be able to drive them completely from the vast, mostly empty area, and if Mali's shaky military forces could retain control.<sup>129</sup>

### Assessment

Up until the coup in 2012, Mali was considered one of the more stable countries in the North African region. While ranked low in many developmental areas, Mali ranked higher than either Afghanistan or Iraq in many areas in many reports:

- WGI: While Mali's overall ratings for each of these groupings were higher than Afghanistan and Iraq, trends over the past 15 years were more mixed. Five areas, Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption did not change significantly since 1996; however, the numbers are generally 20 to 30 percent higher than the ratings for the other two countries. One group, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, saw a significant decrease in rating, moving from approximately 50 percent in 1996 to 25 percent in 2011. While the rating dropped over this period, the rating is still higher than the last report from the other two countries.<sup>130</sup>
- CW Indicators: Mali scored five (out of ten) in both Political Risk Index and the Political Stability Index by Fund for Peace. Compared to Afghanistan (two) and Iraq (three), Mali is significantly better.<sup>131 132</sup>
- Freedom House Rankings: Similar to Afghanistan and Iraq, Freedom house rate Mali low with a Political Rights score of 2 (and trending up), and Civil Liberties score of 3. Unlike the other two cases, the Freedom House assessed Mali as "Free."<sup>133</sup>
- HDI: in 2011, Mali ranked 160th out of 169, placing it in the "Low Human Development" category, but above Iraq (132) and Afghanistan (155).<sup>134</sup>
- CPI Indices: In 2012, Mali was 105 out of 174 in Transparency International's annual index of corruption perceptions.<sup>135</sup> (Iraq was 169 and Afghanistan was tied at 174.)

- Brookings Institute – Index of State Weakness: Mali was ranked 52 of the worst countries, placing it in the second quintile (versus Iraq and Afghanistan in the bottom quintile). Of note, the individual core function scores for Political (6.16) and Security (8.4) placed Mali in the third quintile for those areas.<sup>136</sup>

## Discussion

Thus far, the situation in Mali is only remotely related to either Afghanistan or Iraq in that a foreign country invaded to suppress extreme terrorist activities. However, the U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan was to replace the regime, while that is not France's intent. Additionally, in this case, Mali asked for help and a U.N. effort to counter the militants had stalled before France invaded.<sup>137</sup> Yet post-Iraq and Afghanistan experiences resulted in skepticism for any Western military intervention. The UNSC is currently looking to adopt a resolution to place the African mission under the U.N. with the intent to execute a peacekeeping mission.<sup>138</sup>

The U.N. has a vast history of experience with peacekeeping missions. However, after decades of relative stability, Mali is currently plagued by many similar problems Afghanistan and Iraq face: government corruption, ethnic and separatist tensions, drug trafficking, and increasingly weak national institutions, particularly the army.<sup>139</sup> A U.N. peacekeeping mission will be a good start to ensuring security; however, peacekeeping efforts may not be sufficient to contain violence or restore government legitimacy. Additionally, al-Qaida is known to be associated with the terrorists in the north. If peacekeeping efforts are insufficient, U.S. may feel compelled to become more directly involved by sending in military troops.

If the mission evolves past peacekeeping efforts, now is the time to consider goals and priorities, and how to assess any strategy to ensure proper implementation.

Beyond security concerns, the international community must consider other issues if Mali is to achieve long term stability. Some of these goals should include governance, economic stabilization, democratization and development.

Once the key stakeholders agree on the goals and priorities, and strategy formulation begins, it is critical that planners consider how to assess their efforts at this stage, not just to see if the program is a success or failure at the end when troops are withdrawing, but to see when course corrections are required along the way. Current reports show that Mali is better postured in many areas than either Afghanistan or Iraq, even after years of U.S. state building efforts in those two countries. However, without strategic direction, the situation in Mali could deteriorate quickly.

### Summary

The U.S. has a history of invading countries and trying to rebuild the state in post conflict environment. Unfortunately, the U.S. has only been successful in one third of these endeavors. The U.S. has relied too heavily on the military, which is ill equipped and ill trained for such missions. Reviewing the outcome from recent endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq has highlighted the lack of significant success building capacity in many areas considered by organizations around the world as priorities and goals for weak states.

With recent events in Mali, now is the time to consider what will be required to prevent Mali from becoming another failed state building mission. One of the lessons learned from Afghanistan is the following: “the need to adopt a realistic strategy from the onset. A great deal of the time and effort required needs to be applied at the onset of the mission while local circumstances are still fluid and propitious.”<sup>140</sup>

Before further resources are committed to Mali, or other potential countries where state building may be involved, the international community should review lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq and develop more comprehensive strategies and evaluation frameworks. Following the hierarchy of evaluation, the international community needs to assess the countries needs using the U.N.'s Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) or some other tool.

In addition, an end state needs to be defined in Mali. The USIP "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction" offers an excellent framework to establish goals and whole of government approach missing in U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the USIP MPICE offers a method for evaluating efforts, not just when efforts are ending, but from the beginning when programs can be evaluated as to whether they are on track, behind, or need to be canceled or redirected.

Mali is not Afghanistan or Iraq. However, without planning for the future now, it could turn into a similar situation quickly.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Writing from the Journal of the Military Institute, volume 41, 1907, p 157.

<sup>2</sup> James Dobbin, "Nation Building, U.N. Surpasses U.S. on Learning Curve," *Rand Review* 29, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 24.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Report from the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, Forty Seventh Session, June 17, 1972, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277) (accessed February 28, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> *United Nations Peacekeeping Web Page*, "The Early Years," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/early.shtml> (accessed February 28, 2013).

<sup>5</sup> *United Nations Peacekeeping Web Page*, "History of Peacekeeping," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml>, (accessed February 28, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," 2008, [http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone\\_doctrine\\_eng.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf) (accessed February 28, 2013), 18.

<sup>7</sup> *United Nations Association in Canada Web Page*, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding," <http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/un-peacekeeping/fact-sheets/from-peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding/> (accessed March 7, 2013).

<sup>8</sup> *United Nations Association in Canada Web Page*, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding."

<sup>9</sup> "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," 18.

<sup>10</sup> *Wikipedia Web Page*, "Nation-building," <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation-building> (accessed January 13, 2013).

<sup>11</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Nation Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3.

<sup>12</sup> Keith Darden and Harris Mylonas, "The Promethean Dilemma: Third Party State-Building in Occupied Territories," *Ethnopolitics* 11, no 1 (March 2012): 86.

<sup>13</sup> Of note, nation building and state building are often confused. Both have fairly narrow and different definitions in political science. In this paper, the former refers to national identity, the latter to infrastructure and the institutions of the state.

<sup>14</sup> James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation), 2007, xvii.

<sup>15</sup> Samuel Berger, Brent Scowcroft, and William L. Nash, "In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities," (New York City, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 2005): 19.

<sup>16</sup> Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide*, xx.

<sup>17</sup> *Wikipedia Web Page*, "Timeline of United States Military Operations," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline\\_of\\_United\\_States\\_military\\_operations#endnote\\_RL30172](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_United_States_military_operations#endnote_RL30172) (accessed on February 28, 2013). There have been numerous non state building interventions. Two examples are Operation EAGLE CLAW and the attempted hostage rescue in Iran in 1979 and Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989, where the regime was removed, but the U.S. was not directly involved in political administration post regime removal.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Other possible intervention goals could be retaliation, such as Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, Operation PRAYING MANTIS in 1988, attacks on terrorists, such as Operation INFINITE REACH in Afghanistan in 1998, or protection of civilians, such as Operation ALLIED FORCE during the Kosovo War in 1999.

<sup>19</sup> Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, "Lessons from the Past, American Record on Nation Building," April 11, 2003, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief24.pdf> (accessed on March 7, 2013).

<sup>20</sup> James L. Payne, "Does Nation Building Work?" *The Independent Review* 10, no 4 (Spring, 2006): 599-602. Success was based on the notion of durability of the new government and looked for events indicating the collapse of democratic rule over time, such as suppression



of opposition parties, major infringements of freedom of speech, etc, as well as strong evidence the democracy survived, such as numerous free and fair elections.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 604-605.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 604-606.

<sup>23</sup> *United States Institute of Peace Home Page*, <http://www.usip.org/> (accessed March 3, 2013.) USIP is an independent, nonpartisan institution created and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts.

<sup>24</sup> Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide*, xxi.

<sup>25</sup> Richard A. Berk and Peter H. Rossi, *Thinking About Program Evaluation 2*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999), 5.

<sup>26</sup> Jennifer D.P. Moroney et al, *Developing an Assessment Framework for U.S. Air Force Building Partnership Programs*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010), 49-55.

<sup>27</sup> Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church, "Evaluating Peacebuilding: Not Yet All It Could Be," 2011, <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/section-ii-analysing-conflict-and-assessing-conflict-termination> (accessed January 4, 2011).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> To date, the MPICE Metric Framework is only actively being used in two efforts stabilization and reconstruction type efforts in Haiti and the Philippines.

<sup>30</sup> John Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, and Barbara Sotirin, eds, *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), A Metrics Framework* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), xii.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., xv-xvi.

<sup>32</sup> Peter H. Rossi, Mark W. Lipsey, and Howard E. Freeman, *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 80.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. Modified from original model.

<sup>34</sup> Moroney et al, *Developing an Assessment Framework*, 55-57.

<sup>35</sup> Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide*, 14-15.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. Modified from original model.

<sup>37</sup> *U.S. Institute for Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institute for Peace, 2009), 2-8 – 2-9.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. Modified from original model.

<sup>39</sup> *Saferworld, Prevention Violent Conflict, Building Safer Lives Web Page*, “Approaching Post-2015 From a Peace Perspective,” August 12, 2012, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/1208%20Saferworld%20brief%20-%20Approaching%20Post-2015%20From%20A%20Peace%20Perspective.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2013).

<sup>40</sup> *Institute for Economics and Peace Web Page*, “Pillars of Peace, Finding the Attitudes, Institutions, and Structures Most Closely Associated with Peace,” September 2011, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Pillars-of-Peace.pdf> (accessed March 7, 2013), 6-7.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Policy Framework, 2011-2015” (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2011), ii-iii.

<sup>42</sup> “Millennium Development Goals.” *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The OECD Observer* 251 (September 2005): 24-25, in ProQuest (accessed January 2, 2013). In 2011, the World Bank observed that no low income conflict affected or fragile state had achieved a single MDG.

<sup>43</sup> *Saferworld, Prevention Violent Conflict, Building Safer Lives Web Page*, “Approaching Post-2015 From a Peace Perspective.”

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* Thirty seven states have endorsed the PSG to date.

<sup>45</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” 2011, <http://www.oecd.org/site/dacpbsbdialogue/documentupload/49151944.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2013).

<sup>46</sup> Moroney et al, *Developing an Assessment Framework*, 57-58.

<sup>47</sup> United Nations, “Guidelines – U.N. Strategic Assessment,” May 2009, [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/Planning%20Toolkit\\_Web%20Version.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/Planning%20Toolkit_Web%20Version.pdf) (accessed February 10, 2013), 2-3.

<sup>48</sup> Moroney et al, *Developing an Assessment Framework*, 58-59.

<sup>49</sup> Berk and Rossi, *Thinking About Program Evaluation*, 66-79.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 84-97.

<sup>52</sup> Moroney et al, *Developing an Assessment Framework*, 59.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 59-60.

<sup>54</sup> Dennis Youngblood Coleman, “Afghanistan, 2012 Country Review”, <http://www.countrywatch.com/pdfs/reviews/B3333LZ9.01b.pdf> (accessed February 1, 2013), 1.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> William Flavin, *Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan. Observations on Civil Military Operations During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2004), ix.

<sup>57</sup> Olivier Neola, "Building Security Institutions: Lessons Learned in Afghanistan," *Focus Strategique*, no. 38, July – August 2012, <http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=7284> (accessed March 8, 2013).

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Flavin, *Civil Military Operations*, 9.

<sup>60</sup> Dennis E. Keller, "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 4-5. Congressional opposition to security force training peaked in 1973, with accusations that police approved, advocated, or taught torture techniques to civilian police from other countries, damaging the image of the United States.

<sup>61</sup> Neola, "Building Security Institutions."

<sup>62</sup> Youngblood Coleman, "Afghanistan," 1.

<sup>63</sup> James Dao and Andrew Lehren, "In Toll of 2,000, New Portrait of Afghan War," *New York Times*, August 21, 2012.

<sup>64</sup> *ICasualties Web Page*, "Operation Enduring Freedom," <http://icasualties.org/oef/> (accessed February 8, 2013). Figure includes deaths not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan and other nations where American forces are directly involved in aiding the war.

<sup>65</sup> Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011), 2.

<sup>66</sup> Worldwide Governance Indicators, "Country Data Report for AFGHANISTAN, 1996-2011," <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c3.pdf> (accessed January 29, 2013).

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. "Government Effectiveness" report in the Afghanistan WGI indicated that there was a spike to nearly 20 percent in 2004, but returned same percentages seen in 2002. Therefore, overall, there was no change.

<sup>69</sup> Youngblood Coleman, "Afghanistan," 111.

<sup>70</sup> Threats to a government's risk of collapse include coups, domestic violence and instability, terrorism, etc.

<sup>71</sup> Youngblood Coleman, "Afghanistan," 121.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 266

<sup>74</sup> *United Nations Development Programme Web Page*, "Human Development Index", <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> (accessed February 1, 2013).

<sup>75</sup> *Transparency International Web Page*, "Corruption Perception Index 2012," <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/> (accessed January 21, 2013).

<sup>76</sup> *Transparency International Web Page*, "Corruption Perception Index 2005," [http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2005](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005) (accessed January 21, 2013). The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys; however, not all surveys include all countries.

<sup>77</sup> Fund for Peace, "Country Profile, Afghanistan, July 2012," July 2012, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/states/ccppr12af-countryprofile-afghanistan-08b.pdf> (accessed January 29, 2013), 1-8.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>81</sup> Susan E. Rice and Steward Patrick, "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World," (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 10.

<sup>82</sup> "Afghanistan MDGs Overview," United Nations, April 1, 2012. [http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=30](http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62&Itemid=30) (accessed March 2, 2013).

<sup>83</sup> *United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan Web Page*, "Enhance Security," July 21, 2011 [http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=68](http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=68) (accessed March 2, 2013).

<sup>84</sup> Al Pessin "Afghan Forces Could Start to Lead Soon, Big Challenges Remain," December 9, 2009, linked from *Voice of America Home Page* at <http://www.voanews.com/content/gates-visits-troops-in-afghanistan-78851682/368812.html> (accessed January 23, 2013).

<sup>85</sup> Paul McLeary, "Will the \$55B Invested In Afghan Forces Pay Off?" *DefenseNews*, February 4, 2013.

<sup>86</sup> Rod Nordland, "With Raw Recruits, Afghan Police Buildup Falters," *The New York Times*, February 2, 2010,

<sup>87</sup> The large problem with police taking bribes corresponds to Afghanistan's poor ranking on the CPI.

<sup>88</sup> Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, "For U.S., Vast Challenge To Expand Afghan Forces," linked from *National Public Radio Home Page* at

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121559123&ps=cprs> (accessed 21 January 21, 2013).

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Neola, "Building Security Institutions."

<sup>92</sup> *The Asia Foundation Web Page*, "Asia Foundation Releases 2012 Survey of the Afghan," November 14, 2012, <http://asiafoundation.org/news/2010/11/asia-foundation-releases-2012-survey-of-the-afghan-people/> (accessed February 1, 2013). The fieldwork for the survey was conducted during June and July 2012. Pollsters conducted personal interviews with a random sample of 6,290 Afghan citizens 18 years of age and older, both women and men, from different social, economic, and ethnic communities in rural and urban areas.

<sup>93</sup> *The Asia Foundation Web Page*, "Visualization Afghanistan: A Survey of the Afghan People," [http://afghansurvey.asiafoundation.org/?utm\\_source=2012pollpage&utm\\_medium=web&utm\\_campaign=ag2012poll](http://afghansurvey.asiafoundation.org/?utm_source=2012pollpage&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=ag2012poll) (accessed February 1, 2013).

<sup>94</sup> The Asia Foundation, "Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People," November 14, 2012, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/KeyFindingsandSummary.pdf> (accessed February 1, 2013), 5. Of note though, some polling points in the survey changed from last year due to security reasons. Thus respondents living in highly insecure areas may be underrepresented and results compared to previous years may be skewed.

<sup>95</sup> *The Asia Foundation Web Page*, "2012 Survey of the Afghan."

<sup>96</sup> Pradumna Bikram Thapa, *Nation-Building in Failed States: The United States' Experiences in Germany and Iraq*, Thesis, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, May 5, 2010), 57.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>98</sup> United Nations, *U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546*, June 8, 2004.

<sup>99</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Assistance to Iraq," October 31, 2012, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_51978.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51978.htm) (accessed February 9, 2013).

<sup>100</sup> Greg Jaffe, "Last U.S. troops cross Iraqi border into Kuwait" *The Washington Post*, December 18, 2011.

<sup>101</sup> Bikram Thapa, *Nation-Building in Failed States*, 72.

<sup>102</sup> Belasco, *The Cost*, 1.

<sup>103</sup> Kitty Donaldson, "UK. Spending on War in Iraq, Afghanistan Rises to \$16 Bln". *Bloomberg*, December 6, 2006.

<sup>104</sup> “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” iCasualties, <http://icasualties.org/iraq/index.aspx> (accessed February 9, 2013).

<sup>105</sup> According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the casualty count was 4,488 at the end of 2011. Sourced from U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Casualty Status,” <http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf> (Accessed February 1, 2013)

<sup>106</sup> *ICasualties Web Page*, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” <http://icasualties.org/iraq/index.aspx> (accessed February 9, 2013).

<sup>107</sup> *Iraq Body Count Web Page*, “Iraqi Deaths from Violence 2003 – 2011,” January 2, 2012 <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/> (accessed February 1, 2013).

<sup>108</sup> Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Internal Displacement Caused by Conflict and Violence”, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/IDMC\\_IDP-figures\\_2001-2010.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/IDMC_IDP-figures_2001-2010.pdf) (accessed February 1, 2013), 2.

<sup>109</sup> The Outputs section of the Iraq Case Study chapter will use the same sources as discussed in the previous chapter, Afghanistan Case Study. More detailed information on the sources in this section can be found in the same section, Inputs and Outputs, in the previous chapter.

<sup>110</sup> Worldwide Governance Indicators, “Country Data Report for IRAQ, 1996-2011,” <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c107.pdf> (accessed January 30, 2013), 1-7.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Youngblood Coleman, “Afghanistan,” 113.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>114</sup> *United Nations Development Programme Web Page*, “Human Development Index”, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> (accessed February 1, 2013).

<sup>115</sup> *Transparency International Web Page*, “Corruption Perception Index 2012.”

<sup>116</sup> *Transparency International Web Page*, “Corruption Perception Index 2003,” [http://archive.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2003](http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2003) (accessed January 21, 2013).

<sup>117</sup> Fund for Peace, “Country Profile, Iraq, July 2012,” July 2012, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/states/ccppr12iq-countryprofile-iraq-08b.pdf> (accessed January 29, 2013), 4.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>120</sup> Rice and Patrick, “Index of State Weakness,” 10.

<sup>121</sup> United Nations and Government of Iraq, "Report Acknowledges Need to Work Better Towards Achieving Development in Iraq," August 5, 2010, <http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/mdgs/Press-Release-MDGs-Report-Campaign.pdf> (accessed March 2, 2013).

<sup>122</sup> The IRI survey randomly sampled 3,000 Iraqi citizens who were able to vote and was representative of the general Iraqi population by age, gender, ethnicity, religion and education.

<sup>123</sup> "IRI Poll: Iraqis Want Provincial Councils to Have More Authority," International Republican Institute, November 27, 2012, <http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/survey-shows-optimism-among-iraqis> (accessed February 3, 2013).

<sup>124</sup> Michael E. O'Hanlon and Ian Livingston, "Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Iraq," August 30, 2011, Linked from *Brookings Home Page* at <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Centers/saban/iraq%20index/index20110830.PDF> (accessed March 2, 2013). Results from IRI are similar to Brookings Institute Iraq Index, in which 57% of the nation thought the government was heading in the wrong direction in 2010. Sourced from

<sup>125</sup> International Republican Institute, "IRI Iraqi Index," November 27, 2012, <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20November%2027%20IRI%20Iraq%20Index%2C%20September%201-7%2C%202012.pdf> (accessed February 3, 2013), 1.

<sup>126</sup> *The New York Times Web Page*, "Mali," <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mali/index.html> (accessed February 3, 2103).

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Worldwide Governance Indicators, "Country Data Report for MALI, 1996-2011," <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c144.pdf> (accessed February 9, 2013), 1-7.

<sup>131</sup> Youngblood Coleman, "Afghanistan," 114.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 125.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>134</sup> *United Nations Development Programme Web Page*, "Human Development Index."

<sup>135</sup> *Transparency International Web Page*, "Corruption Perception Index 2012."

<sup>136</sup> Rice and Patrick, "Index of State Weakness," 10.

<sup>137</sup> David Rhode, "A Malian Quagmire? In Defense of French Invasion," *The Atlantic*, January 20, 2013.

<sup>138</sup> John Irish, "France wants U.N. Peacekeeping Force by Mali by April," *Reuters*, February 6, 2013.

<sup>139</sup> Rhode, "A Malian Quagmire?"

<sup>140</sup> Neola, "Building Security Institutions."